The ethical implications of human clones have been much alluded to, but have seldom been examined with any rigour. This paper examines the possible uses and abuses of human cloning and draws out the principal ethical dimensions, both of what might be done and its meaning. The paper examines some of the major public and official responses to cloning by authorities such as President Clinton, the World Health Organisation, the European parliament, UNESCO, and others and reveals their inadequacies as foundations for a coherent public policy on human cloning. The paper ends by defending a conc-eption of reproductive rights or "procreative autonomy" which shows human cloning to be not inconsistent with human rights and dignity.
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The recent announcement of a birth' in the press heralds an event probably unparalleled for two millennia and has highlighted the impact of the genetic revolution on our lives and personal choices. More importantly perhaps, it raises questions about the legitimacy of the sorts of control individuals and society purport to exercise over something, which while it must sound portentous, is nothing less than human destiny. This birth, that of "Dolly", the cloned sheep, is also illustrative of the responsibilities of science and scientists to the communities in which they live and which they serve, and of the public anxiety that sensational scientific achievements sometimes provokes.
The ethical implications of human clones have been much alluded to, but have seldom been examined with any rigour. Here I will examine the possible uses and abuses of human cloning and draw out the principal ethical dimensions, both of what might be done and its meaning, and of public and official responses.
There are two rather different techniques available for cloning individuals. One is by nuclear substitution, the technique used to create Dolly, and the
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other is by cell mass division or "embryo splitting". We'll start with cell mass division because this is the only technique for cloning that has, as yet, been used in humans.
Cell mass division
Although the technique of cloning embryos by cell mass division has, for some time been used extensively in animal models, it was used as a way of multiplying human embryos for the We should remember that such twins will be "identical" in the sense that they will each have the same genotype, but they will never (unlike some but by no means all natural monozygotic twins) be identical in the more familiar sense of looking identical at the same moment in time. If we think of expected similarities in character, tastes and so on, then the same is true. The further separated in time, the less likely they are to have similarities of character (the more different the environment, the more different environmental influence on individuality). We noted earlier the possibility of using embryo splitting to allow genetic and other screening by embryo biopsy. One embryo could be tested and then destroyed to ascertain the health and genetic status of the remaining clones. Again, an objection often voiced to this is that it would violate the Kantian principle, and that "one twin would be destroyed for the sake of another". This is a bizarre and misleading objection both to using cell mass division to create clones for screening purposes, and to creating clones by nuclear substitution to generate spare cell lines. It is surely ethically dubious to object to one embryo being sacrificed for the sake of another, but not to object to it being sacrificed for nothing. In in vitro fertilisation, for example, it is, in the United Kingdom, currently regarded as good practice to store spare embryos for future use by the mother or for disposal at her direction, either to other women who require donor embryos, or for research, or simply to be destroyed. It cannot be morally worse to use an embryo to provide information about its sibling, than to use it for more abstract research or simply to destroy it. If it is permissible to use early embryos for research or to destroy them, their use in genetic and other health testing is surely also permissible. The same would surely go for their use in creating cell lines for therapeutic purposes.
It is better to do good A moral principle, that has at least as much intuitive force as that recommended by Kant, is that it is better to do some good than to do no good. It cannot, from the ethical point of view, be better or more moral to waste human material that could be used for therapeutic purposes, than to use it to do good. And I cannot but think that if it is right to use embryos for research or therapy then it is also right to produce them for such purposes."5 Kant's prohibition does after all refer principally to use. Of course some will think that the embryo is a full member of the moral community with all the rights and protections possessed by Kant himself. While this is a tenable position, it is not one held by any society which permits abortion, post-coital contraception, or research with human embryos.
The UNESCO approach to cloning is scarcely more coherent than that of WHO; how does cloning affect "the preservation of the human genome as common heritage of humanity"? Does this mean that the human genome must be "preserved intact", that is without variation, or does it mean simply that it must not be "reproduced a-sexually"? Cloning cannot be said to impact on the variability of the human genome, it merely repeats one infinitely small part of it, a part that is repeated at a natural rate of about 3-5 per thousand births. '6 Genetic variability A right to parents
The apparently overwhelming imperative to identify some right that is violated by human cloning sometimes expresses itself in the assertion of "a right to have two parents" or as "the right to be the product of the mixture of the genes of two individuals". These are on the face of it highly artificial and problematic rights -where have they sprung from, save from a desperate attempt to conjure some rights that have been violated by cloning? However, let's take them seriously for a moment and grant that they have some force. Are they necessarily violated by the nuclear transfer technique?
If the right to have two parents is understood to be the right to have two social parents, then it is of course only violated by cloning if the family identified as the one to rear the resulting child is a oneparent family. This is not of course necessarily any more likely a result of cloning, than of the use of any of the other new reproductive technologies (or indeed of sexual reproduction). Moreover if there is such a right, it is widely violated, creating countless "victims", and there is no significant evidence of any enduring harm from the violation of this supposed right. Indeed war widows throughout the world would find its assertion highly offensive.
If, on the other hand we interpret a right to two parents as the right to be the product of the mixture of the genes of two individuals, then the supposition that this right is violated when the nucleus of the cell of one individual is inserted into the de-nucleated egg of another, is false in the way this claim is usually understood. There is at least one sense in which a right expressed in this form might be violated by cloning, but not in any way which has force as an objection. Firstly it is false to think that the clone is the genetic child of the nucleus donor. It is not. The clone is the twin brother or sister of the nucleus donor and the genetic offspring of the nucleus donor's own parents. Thus this type of cloned individual is, and always must be, the genetic child of two separate genotypes, of two genetically different individuals, however often it is cloned or re-cloned.
Two parents good, three parents better
However, the supposed right to be the product of two separate individuals is perhaps violated by cloning in a novel way. The de-nucleated egg contains mitochondrial DNA -genes from the female whose egg it is. The inevitable presence of the mitochondrial genome of the egg donor, means that the genetic inheritance of clones is in fact richer than that of other individuals, richer in the sense of being more variously derived.20 This can be important if the nucleus donor is subject to mitochondrial diseases inherited from his or her mother and wants a child genetically related to her that will be free of these diseases. How this affects alleged rights to particular combinations of "parents" is more difficult to imagine, and perhaps underlines the confused nature of such claims.
What good is cloning?
One major reason for developing cloning in animals is said to be4 to permit the study of genetic diseases and indeed genetic development more generally. Whether The unease caused by Dolly's birth may be due to the fact that it was just such a technique that informed the plot of the film "The Boys from Brazil" in which Hitler's genotype was cloned to produce a fuehrer for the future. The prospect of limitless numbers of clones of Hitler is rightly disturbing. However, the numbers of clones that could be produced of any one genotype will, for the foreseeable future, be limited not by the number of copies that could be made of one genotype (using serial nuclear transfer techniques 470 copies of a single nuclear gene in cattle have been reported),22 but by the availability of host human mothers.23 Mass production in any democracy could therefore scarcely be envisaged. Moreover, the futility of any such attempt is obvious. Hitler's genotype might conceivably produce a "gonadically challenged" individual of limited stature, but reliability in producing an evil and vicious megalomaniac is far more problematic, for reasons already noted in our consideration of cloning by cell mass division.
Dolly collapses the divide between germ and somatic cells
There are some interesting implications of cloning by nuclear substitution (which have been clear since frogs were cloned by this method in the 1950s) which have not apparently been noticed.24 There is currently a world-wide moratorium on manipulation of the human germ line, while therapeutic somatic line interventions are, in principal, permitted. 13 However, inserting the mature nucleus of an adult cell into a de-nucleated egg turns the cells thus formed into germ line cells. This has three important effects. First, it effectively eradicates the firm divide between germ line and somatic line nuclei because each adult cell nucleus is in principle "translatable" into a germ line cell nucleus by transferring its nucleus and creating a clone. Secondly, it permits somatic line modifications to human cells to become germ line modifications. Suppose you permanently insert a normal copy of the adenosine deaminase gene into the bone marrow cells of an individual suffering from severe combined immuno-deficiency (which affects the so called "bubble boy" who has to live in a protective bubble of clean air) with obvious beneficial therapeutic effects. This is a somatic line modification. If you then cloned a permanently genetically modified bone marrow cell from this individual, the modified genome would be passed to the clone and become part of his or her genome, transmissible to her offspring indefinitely through the germ line. Thus a benefit that would have perished with the original recipient and not been passed on for the protection of her children, can be conferred on subsequent generations by cloning. 25 The third effect is that it shows the oft asserted moral divide between germ line and somatic line therapy to be even more ludicrous than was previously supposed. '5 Immortality? The point is that the sorts of freedoms which freedom of religion guarantees, freedom to choose one's own way of life and live according to one's most deeply held beliefs are also at the heart of procreative choices. And Dworkin concludes: "that no one may be prevented from influencing the shared moral environment, through his own private choices, tastes, opinions, and example, just because these tastes or opinions disgust those who have the power to shut him up or lock him up."31
Thus it may be that we should be prepared to accept both some degree of offence and some social disadvantages as a price we should be willing to pay in order to protect freedom of choice in matters of procreation and perhaps this applies to cloning as much as to more straightforward or usual procreative preferences. 32 The nub of the argument is complex and abstract but it is worth stating at some length. I cannot improve upon Dworkin's formulation of it.
"The right of procreative autonomy has an important place . . . in Western political culture more generally. The most important feature of that culture is a belief in individual human dignity: that people have the moral right -and the moral responsibilityto confront the most fundamental questions about the meaning and value of their own lives for themselves, answering to their own consciences and convictions.... The principle of procreative autonomy, in a broad sense, is embedded in any genuinely democratic culture.`3 3 In so far as decisions to reproduce in particular ways or even using particular technologies constitute decisions concerning central issues of value, then arguably the freedom to make them is guaranteed by the constitution (written or not) of In the absence of compelling arguments against human cloning, we can bid Dolly a cautious "hello".
We surely have sufficient reasons to permit experiments on human embryos to proceed, provided, as with any such experiments, the embryos are destroyed at an early stage.34 While we wait to see whether the technique will ever be established as safe, we should consider the best ways to regulate its uptake until we are in a position to know what will emerge both by way of benefits and in terms of burdens.
